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Introduction. 
Public International Law is deeply imbedded in time. 
It bears the influences of changes in international relations 
and its action happens in time and space. 
The time factor in Public International Law has three 
forms: the instant, the duration and the change. 
The instant is taken in consideration to determine the 
moment or the date in which a fact produces certain effects. 
Ali legal system have institutions that are grounded 
in the second element — the duration. In International Law, 
this notion is less rigorous than in the municipal law, 
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nevertheless there is a great deal of delays: delay of pro-
cedure, delay of appeal, etc. 
The third form is the change. The circumstances chan-
ge m a y influence the rules and transform law. 
The question of application of rules in time arises from 
changes in the law. W h e n the law changes, it is necessary to 
circumscribe the field of application of the past and of 
the new law. This delimitation is the task of the intertem-
poral law, which largely depends of the solution given 
to the problem of the division of time. 
Although time is fluent, w e are used to dividing it in 
moments: past, present and future. This causes difficulties, 
since the division of time is arbitrary. 
Three ways of possible action of rule in time corres-
pond to three moments of time fluency. The rule's action 
m a y refer to the past. In this case, w e will have retroacti-
ve effect. Belating to the present, it will become immediatly 
effective. If the action refers to the future, w e will have 
postponed effect. 
Three theories were proposed to settle the problems of 
conflict of law in time: The theory of causes, the theory of 
rights and the theory of f acts and situations. 
In the first theory w e must examine if there was a 
final judiciary decision, discerning the past causes, the 
causes in operation and the future causes ("causae finitae, 
pendentes et futurae"). 
In the second theory, w e ought to look for an acquired 
right ("jura quaesita"). There will be retroactivity if it 
affects acquired rights. One must distinguish between acqui-
red rights and the non-acquired rights or rights in course 
of acquisition. 
In the latter theory the action of the rule will be de-
fined in connection with facts and legal situations. The 
existence of past, pendent, in course or future action 
("facta praeterita, pendentia et futura") will have to be 
established. 
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The theory of causes is less employed in Public Inter-
national L a w than in municipal law due to the smaller 
-number of judiciary or arbitrary decisions. 
Besides the respect toward the "causae finitae", the 
retroactivity is sometimes attenuated by the grant of delays 
that makes easy the application of the new law. The new 
rule m a y decide that a past fact did not have enough power 
to produce certain situations, but the past effects of these 
situations will be respected — temperate retroactivity. 
The retroactivity's notion is not monolithic, since it's 
present on se ver ai forms. 
The retroactivity is only one of the three positions of 
a rule in time and questions of time do not limit themselves 
to problems of non-retroactivity. 
Necessity, Nature, Basis and Value of the Principie of 
Non-retroactivity. 
The questions of necessity nature, basis and value of 
the principie of non-retroactivity in Public International 
L a w have not been discussed yet by the doctrine and were 
only lighty touched by jurisprudence. 
C H A R L E S R O U S S E A U and B A A D E recognize the necessity 
of the principie of non-retroactivity, though they admit that 
this principie has certain limits. However other internatio-
nalists doubt such necessity. Some italian jurists — as CA-
VAGLIERI for instance — deny the possibility of a transitory 
law in International L a w and consequently reject the exis-
tence of a principie of non-retroactivity. 
The principie of non-retroactivity was concerned by 
municipal legislations. This principie was introduced by 
the constituent or normal legislator or by jurisprudence. 
The the principie of non-retroactivity is liable to be con 
sidered as a "general principie of law recognized by civi-
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lized nations" in the sense of art. 38 § 1 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. 
The principie of non-retroactivity of international ru-
les was approved by the conventional practice, by the prac-
tice of International Organizations and by the Internatio-
nal judges and arbiters. Nevertheless, this principie was 
deemed expressly as a general principie. 
From the legal technical point of view the problems 
arisen from the principie of non-retroactivity are essen-
cially the same both in municipal and international law. 
This is due to the fact that the basis are the same in the 
two cases. 
The essential basis of the principie of non-retroactivity 
in Public International L a w and in municipal law results 
from the necessity to assure the security of legal relations. 
These basis are not accepted unanimously. The adherents 
of the new laws application, for extralegal or political 
reasons, often invoke the imperatives of progress against 
the principie of non-retroactivity. As a matter of fact, the 
necessity of adaptability of law to the variable conditions 
on international relations, under certain circumstances, re-
quires that to the adaptabilit be superposed the necessity 
of security. 
The principie of non-retroactivity in Public Internatio-
na L a w is not an absolute principie, since it must consider 
certain externai effects. 
The principie of non-retroactivity does not have the 
same value in ali cases. The practice admits that the trea-
ties and conventions m a y derogate it expressly or even ta-
citly. Nevertheless, this principie has a superior value re-
garding treaties in the sense that the exceptions to this 
principie must be interpreted restrictively. The introduc-
tion in Public International L a w of the notion of "Jus Co-
gens" puts the problem of value of the principie of non-
-retroactivity in connection with "Jus Cogens". It seems 
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that the Commission gave to the "Júris Cogentis" rules cer-
tain consequences that turn true to the past. 
The Principie of Non-retroactivity and the International 
Treaties. 
TAVERNIER made a statistical and systematic search 
about treaties signed by States and International Organi-
zations with a view to extracting from numerous interna-
tional conventions the principie of non-retroactivity. 
H e adopted the most general definition of retroativity: 
The retroactivity results from the anteriority of the 
coming into effect of the signature of the treaty, and from 
the anteriority of the date of the effects in regard to the 
entry into force. The date of entry into force and the date 
of signature m a y sometimes be the same. 
H e arrived at the folloving conclusions: 
1 — It is extremely rare to find non-retroactivity ex-
pressly stipulated in the conventions; 
2 — The number of retro active treaties among the 
treaties examined is very small less than 10%. 
This means that non-retroactivity is the rule and retro-
activity the exception. 
The reasons which seem to have led the States to stipula-
te the retroactivity are chiefly the interpretative or com-
plementary character of the convention or the necessity 
of regulating a situation arisen before the treaty. It seems 
that the last one is the principal reason for retroactivity of 
treaties and which m a y be subdivided into the following: 
1 —• The States want to fill a legal gap — a situation 
of fact grown an applicable legal rule. 
2 — The retroactivity is due to the desire to avoid 
the break of continuity in the application of legal rules. 
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3 — The retroactivity is stipulated by the contracting 
States in order to permit the harmonization of the time 
application of legal rules belonging to different legal 
orders, but which governs the same situation or are con-
tained in separate conventions, notwithstanding the connec-
ted rule situations. 
4 — Retroactivity is stipulated to regulate certain si-
tuations that without it would be against the law. One can 
still find the retroactivity adjusted for technical reasons or 
accidentaly, when it results from the terms of the agreement 
without the will of the parties. 
Since the retroactivity results frequently from an ex-
press clause or particular reason, the rule is the non-re-
troactivity of the treaties and conventions. 
The retroactivity of interpretation. 
According to ROUSSEAU an interpreted rule is not a new 
rule and can therefore be retroactive. 
In the Chamizal Case between United States and Mé-
xico, the comission refuted the Mexican thesis of non-re-
troactivy saying that the interpretative treaties or conven-
tions are applied retroactively. 
In the Sambiaggio Case "The Umpire concludes that 
the interpretation of the old treaty in article VIII of the 
Protocol has no retroactive effect and no reference to pend-
ing arbitrations". This sentence does not contradict the 
principie of retroactive effect on interpretative conventions, 
since the protocol of 1903 in spite of its terms did not ex-
press an interpretative rule of the 1861 treaty but a new one. 
The interpretation's retroactivity is admitted by doc-
trine and by jurisprudence. The PCIJ, in the German Mino-
rity Schools in Upper Silesia Case, referring to the inter-
pretation of articles 74 and 131 of the German-Polish Con-
vention (May 15th, 1922) says: 
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"... in accordance with the rules of law, the intepre-
tation given by the Court to the terms of the Convention 
has retrospective effect — in the sense that terms of the 
convention must be held to have always borne the meaning 
placed upon them by this interpretation. ." 
Its is characteristic of the authentic interpretation — 
either judiciary or conventional — that its effects go back 
to the time when the rule interpreted appeared. This re-
troactivity is an exception that confirms the rule on non-
-retroactivity. 
The cases of conventional retroactivity explainable by 
the principie of autonomy of the will are also exceptions 
to the rule of non-retroactivity. 
The international judge or arbiter and the principie of 
non-retroactivity. 
The international judge or arbiter tends to stay clear 
as far as possible, from questions of intertemporal law. 
This tendency is not peculiar to Public International Law, 
since it can be found also in municipal law. 
The judge, faced with a problem of retroactivity, is 
liable to adopt three attitudes: 1 — to pass it over; 2 — 
not to commit himself over it; 3 — to reject the principie. 
1 — In the Veloz-Mariana Case that opposed France 
and Spain in 1823 and in the Anglo-Brazilian Arbitration 
of 1904, to solve the problems of frontiers of British-
-Guyana, the arbiters applied retroactively a new customary 
rule. They attributed retroactive effect without posing the 
question of retroactivity. 
There are other instances in which the international 
judge or arbiter delivered a dubious decision. 
2 — In the case of liquidation of naval expenses in the 
war against Spain, the arbiter did not pronounce himself 
expressly on the question of retroactivity. H e declared 
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simply that the treaty had been applicable since its signa-
ture, thus accepting the retroactive effect of the ratifica-
tion, without saying, however, if the treaty was retroactive. 
In the cases of Eastern Greenland and of Minquiers et 
Ecréhos, the parties mutually contested the sovereignty 
over a territory and invoked medieval titles. The Hague 
Court had to make an option between the application of 
the modern rules of International L a w concerning the 
acquisition of territory (retroactive application of modern 
Law) and the application of the L a w in force in the 
Middle Ages. 
In the two sentences it is impossible to discover which 
of these two points were followed. 
3 — In the Alabama Case, the Arbitration court 
applied the "Washington rules to facts happened when 
such rules were not in vigour. The principie of non-retro-
activity was rejected by virtue of an express cláuse. 
In the Mavrommatis Concessions Case, the Court attri-
buted retroactive effect to Protocol XII, since the retroac-
tivity derived from its terms and purpose: 
"Protocol XII was drawn up in order to fix the condi-
tions governing the recognition and treatment by the con-
tracting parties of certain concessions granted by the 
Ottoman authorities before of the conclusion of the pro-
tocol. A n essencial characteristic therefore of Protocol is 
that its effects extend to legal situations dating from a 
previous time to its own existence. If provisions were not 
made in the clauses of the Protocol for the protection of 
the recognized rights are against infringements before the 
coming into force of that instrument, the Protocol would be 
ineffective wirth regard to the very period in which the 
rights in question are most in need of protection. The 
Court therefore considers that the Protocol guarantees the 
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rights recognized in it against any violation regardless of 
the date on which it m a y have taken place". 
Attitude of the international Judge or Arbiter in face of 
the non-retroactivity of conventions. 
In the Sambiaggio and Chamizal Cases, the arbiters-
affirmed the principie of non-retroactivity even before con-
sidering the cases of interpretative conventions and in both 
cases the international convention was assimilated to the 
national law with regard to the non-retroactivity. 
In the Ambatielos Case, the Court rejected the reaso-
ning of Greece that appealed to the theory of similar clau-
ses: 
"Accepter cette théorie serait conférer un effet ré-
troactif a 1'article 29 du traité de 1926, alors que 1'article 
32 du m ê m e traité énonce que le traité, ce qui doit signifier 
toutes les dispositions du traité, entrera en viguer dês sa 
ratification. Cette conclusion pu être contredite s'il avait 
existe une clause ou une raison particulière appelant une 
interpretation rétroactif. II n'existe pas dans le cas pre-
sent de telle clause ni de telle raison. II est donc impossi-
ble d'admettre que l'une quelconque de ses dispositions 
doive être considere c o m m e ayant été en viguer à une 
date antérieure". 
The Court admits that a treaty m a y be retroactive if it 
contains "une clause ou une raison particulière appelant une 
interpretation rétroactf". If there is a particular clause 
it will express retroactivity. This exception to the prin-
cipie of non-retroactivity is usually admitted; is is explained 
easily by the principie of autonomy of will. 
The international jurisprudence recognizes that a con-
vention m a y have a retroactive effect when this is ex-
pressly provided for. 
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"Raison particulière appelant une interpretation ré-
troactif" is tacit retroactivity, that is, the retroactivity de-
rives implicity from the treaty. 
There is still the case in which the treaty has retro-
active effects because of its very nature: interpretative 
treaties. 
The European Convention on H u m a n Rights did not 
have articles establishing its incompetence "rationae tem-
poris", however "L'existence du chef d'irrécévabilité "ra-
tionae temporis" derive cependant du príncipe de la non-
-retroactivité des traités et conventions, lequel se range 
parmi les príncipes de droit international généralement 
reconnus". 
The Commision bases its decision concerning the 
retroactivity on a principie foreign to the convencion, but 
that imposes itself to it in the absence of an express clause 
to the contrary. 
The non-retroactivity and the International Law Commission. 
The principie of non-retroactivity was not arraigned 
in the International L a w Commission. Ali the adopted and 
proposed texts contained such a principie with two ex-
ceptions: the express and the tacit retroactivity, inspired 
directly by jurisprudence and mainly by Ambatielos Sen-
tence. 
The fourth report of Sir FITZMAURICE, in section. 24 § 
4.°, consecrated the principie of non-retroactivity: 
"Unless a treaty specifically so provides, or a neces-
sary implication to the that effect is to be drawn from its 
terms, it cannot give rise to retroactive rights or obligations, 
and there exists a presumption agains retroactivity". 
But the rapporteur observed that: "There is some 
danger of confusion about the subject of the retroactivity 
of treaties. In a certain sense, a treaty, whatever it m a y say, 
can never be retroactive, because it can never come into 
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force previous to the date provided for according Io its 
terms, or in default of clear terms on the subject, according 
to the principie already set ou in part I of chapter I of the 
Code. But a treaty can of course perfectly well provide that, 
although ií does not come into force until a certain date, 
it shall nevertheless, when it does come into force, be 
deemed to relate back in certain ways to events that have 
already occured. Where a treaty has retroactive effects in 
this sense, the obligation to apply it, or any particular pro-
vision of it retroactively can nevertheless not exist before 
a certain date, namely the date of the coming into force 
of the treaty; but that fact does not prevent the obligation 
that has to be applied retroactively arising when this date 
is reached — on the contrary, it causes it to do so. It is 
clear that only express terms or an absolutely necessary 
inference can produce such a result. The presumption must 
always be against retroactivity". 
In 1964 was adopted art. 56 which has been art. 57 of 
W A L D O C K ' S third report, with small modifications: 
Art. 57 — Application of treaty provisions "rationae 
temporis" 
1 — Unless a treaty expressly or impliedly provides 
otherwise, its provisions apply to each party only with res-
pect to facts or matters arising or subsisting while the treaty 
is in force with respect to that party. 
2 — O n the termination or suspension of the operation 
of a treaty, its provisions remain applicable for purposes 
of determining the rights and obligation of the parties 
with respect to facts or matters which arose or subsisted 
whilst it was in force." 
Art. 24 adopted in the project of 1966 retakes art. 56 
adopted in 1964, without paragraph 2: 
"Unless different intention appears from the treaty or 
is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party 
in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situa-
23 -R.F.D. — II 
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tion which ceased to exist before the date of entry into 
force of the treaty with respect to that party". 
The Vienna Conference adopted a text that was similar 
to the text proposed by the I.L.C. Art. 28 retakes the 
rough outline of art. 24 of 1966, with some modifications in 
its formulation: 
"Unless a different intention appears from the treaty 
or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a 
party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any 
situation which ceased do exist before the date of the entry 
into force of the treaty with respect to that party". 
Several amendments were proposed, but~none was 
accepted by the Commission. A n amendment of Áustria 
and Greece aimed at replacing the words "à moins qu'une 
intention différente ne ressorte pas du traité ou ne soit 
par ailleurs établie" by "à moins que le traité n'en dis-
pose ainsi". The intention was to exclude the possibility 
of tacit retroactivity, that is, the retroactivity derived from 
the nature or character of the treaty. 
Despite the amendments, none of the States denied the 
principie of non-retroactivity. The proposed amendments 
draw the attention to the ambiguity of some words of the 
I.L.C. project and to the uncertainties in the meaning of 
the principie. The Convention text did not dispel ali doubts. 
This is particularly true concerning the non-retroactivity of 
"Jus Cogens". 
The principie of non-retroactivity was consecrated in 
the 1969 text with ref erence to the very Convention by Art. 4, 
which had not figured in the 1966 project: 
"Without prejudice to the application of any rules set 
forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be 
subject under international law independently of the Con-
vention, the Convention applies only to treatries which are 
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present 
Convention with regard to such States". 
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"Jus Cogens" and non-retroactivity 
The I.L.C. considers that the rules of "Jus Cogens" 
do not have retroactive effects; it is clearly so declared in 
the commentaries of art. 50 and 61 of the 1966 project. In 
Art. 50 that takes into consideration the case of a treaty that 
is void at the time of its conclusion due to its dispositions 
being in conflict with an already existent peremptory norm 
of general international law. Art 61 considers the case of a 
treaty valid at the time of its conclusion, that becomes void 
due to the advent of a new norm of "jus congens". This 
words "becomes void and terminates" show clearly that 
in the opinion of the Commision, the advent of a new 
norm of "jus cogens" m a y not have a retroactive effect 
on the validity of the treaty. 
Nevertless, in the case of art. 50 (Art. 71 — § 1.° of 
the Vienna Convention) that "the parties shall eliminate 
as far as possible the consequences of any act performed 
in reliance on any provisions which conflits with the pe-
remptory norm of general international law..." It is a 
case of temperate retroactivity. 
Regarding to the hypothesis of the advent of a new 
rule of "Jus cogens" (Art. 61) art. 70 § 2,° says that "The 
termination of the treaty: 
b — does not affect any right, obligation or legal si-
tuation of the parties created through the execution of the 
treaty prior to its termination." 
The question of non-retroactivity of ratification to the time 
of signature. 
(The North American Jurisprudence and Doctrine) 
In the case of Hylton's Lesses v. Brown, 1866, the Circuit 
Court delivered a decision that applied the rule of retroacti-
vity. This was the first enunciation and application of a 
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doctrine that would be fostered more and more in the United 
States and would influence some European writers. 
A plaintiff brought an action for ejectment, claiming 
under a lease from Joseph Griswold, made in 1789. The de-
fendant answered that the property in question has been 
regularly forfeited under an act of attainder in 1778 in 
accordance with Pennsylvania's Laws, and after some con-
veyances he had been the owner since 1780. The defendant 
pleaded also that any irregularity in the acts of attainder 
was healed by an act of Pennsylvania Legislature of January 
31 st, 1783, which declared that "no misnomer or mistakes 
in name, addition or description, in the proclamations is-
sued by the Executive requiring persons to surrender 
themselves on pain of being attainded of high treason should 
avaü to enable heirs, to recover estates seized and sold as 
forteited". 
The plaintiff alleged the invalidity of this act, on the 
ground that it was in conflict with a treaty between United 
States and Great Britain for preliminary articles of peace 
signed on Nóvember 30 th, 1782, and which was to come 
into force when the treaty of peace had been concluded 
between Great Britain and France. 
O n January 20 th, 1783, the Franco-British articles of 
peace were signed and ratified on February 3rd of the sa-
m e year Did these articles come into force on January 
20th or on February 3rd, so as to bring the British Ame-
rican treaty into force on either date? If the British-Ame-
rican treaty carne into force on January 20th (signature), 
the act of 1783 was void because it was passed after it. 
The resolutions of the Court were the following: 
*'It is contended (by the defendant) that this treaty can 
only be considered as made on the 3rd of February following, 
when it was ratified; and in support of this opinion, it is 
stated that, by its terms, ,it was suspended till ratification. 
No evidence of this has been given; and from the subsis-
tence of these preliminary articles ,.. there is no reason 
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to supose that this was the case ... But even if this were 
the fact, as to this treaty; .. we do not think it would 
affect the case, because, when ratified, the treaty would 
relate back to the signing. The ratifications is nothing 
more than evidence of the authority under which the mi-
nisters acted ...Iam constrained, then, to say, that the 
terms of peace were agreed on between Great Britain and 
France, on the 20th January, and consequently that the 
contingency, on which the treaty between Great Britain 
and the United States was to take effect, happened on, 
and was binding upon, the two nations, from that day, 
if no sooner". 
"Upon the whole, then, it is the opinion of the court, 
that the law of 31st of January, 1783, in posterior to the 
treaty of peace, which is the supreme law". 
The Court invoked the authority of GROTIUS, VATTEL and 
MARTENS in order to support the existence of the rule of 
retroactivity of ratification to the date of signature. Of 
the three, only MARTENS had expressed a definitive opinion 
on the matter: 
"Of treaties in general. Anything that has been pro-
mised by the chief or his agent beyond the limits of the 
authority with which the State has entrusted him, is at 
most no more than a simple promise ("sponsio") On 
the contrary, everything that has been stipulated by an 
agent in conformity with his full powers ought to become 
obligatory for the State from the moment of signing without 
waiting even for a ratification. However, not to expose 
the State to the errors of a single person, it is now 
become a general maxim that public convention do not 
become obligatory till ratified". 
It seems nevertheless, that the agency theory exerted a 
strong influence in formulating such a decision. To the ge-
nerality of XVII century's internationalists, the obligatory 
strengh of a treaty consubstantiates itself at the moment 
of its signature by the plenipotentiaries. This resulted from 
— 356 — 
the application to the full powers of the privatist rules 
about the mandate. 
In despite of its necessity, the formality of ratification 
add nothing to the validity of the treaty, that exists and 
obliges since its signature. It would be only a confirmation 
by reason of courtesy and regularity of the international re-
lations. 
In the case of the United States v. Arredondo, 1832, the 
Supreme Court of the United States added a limitation to 
the rule laid down in Hylton's Lesse v. Brown, it were to 
be deemed as operating retroactively as to the date of sig-
nature only in so f ar as the treaties deal with rights or obli-
fations of the parties as States, but not as the affected 
private rights. 
In the cases of the United States v. Reynes and Davis 
v. Police in 1850, the doctrine asserted in Hylton's Lessee v. 
Brown was approved by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. This Court reaffirmed the limited rule of retroacti-
vity laid down in the Arredondo Case, in 'Haver v, Yaker'. 
The principie of retroactivity has been affirmed by 
American Courts in others cases. 
This doctrine was stated by Moore as follows: 
"A treaty is binding on the contracting parties unless 
otherwise provided, from the date of its signature, the 
exchange of ratifications having, in such case, a retroacti-
ve effect, confirming the treaty from that date". 
During the second part of the last century, Wheatom 
stated that "every treaty is binding on the contracting par-
ties from the date of its signature, unless it contains an 
express stipulation to the contrary. The exchange of ratifi-
cations has retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from 
its date". 
The article 421 of the Bluntschli draft adopts the rule 
of retroactivity (it is the only code on treaties in doing 
that): 
— 357 — 
"Cette règle est Texpression d'un usage reçu par les 
nations. Elle se fonde sur le fait qu'au moment de la signa-
ture du traité, la position respective des états est définiti-
vement regularisée; la ratification, qui survient queiquer 
jours plus tard, a seulement pour but de lever le dernier 
obstacle à Fexécution immédiate du traité. La ratification 
doit donc être considerée comme ayant eu lieu, de la vo-
lonté des parties, à 1'instant de la signature du protocol 
définitif". 
Among the authours of the last century and begining 
of the present that support the doctrine of retroactivity, 
are: CALVO, MÉRIGNHAC, Twiss, WOOLSEY, W H A R T O N , TAY-
LOR, HERSHEY, HYDE, and GRANDALL. 
Less than a century ago, due to the generic acceptance, 
MARTENS said the doctrine of retroactivity was "universally 
recognized and accepted as an axiom by ali authors who 
have written on international law". 
Reaction to the American doctrine. 
GEFFCKEN considered the principie of retroactivity as 
unacceptable, unless there was a contrary clause in the 
treaty. Louter declared that the retroactivity doctrine held 
by the older authors was "the logical result of an erroneous 
conception which regards ratification as a suspensive con-
dition of the obligatory character of a treaty rather than an 
essencial element". Other authors that adopt the same view: 
FAUCHILLE, HOUER, DESPAGNET, PIÉDELIÈVRE, TELTSIK, STRUPP, 
BLOCISZEWSKI, LIZT, GIDEL and MORELLET. 
The protocol of the Congress of Berlin of July 1878, 
said that: "Le Congrès considere que ce sont les ratifica-
tions et non seulement la signature qui donnet aus traités 
valeur définitive". 
Article 8 of the Havana Convention on Treaties of 
1928 declares that "treaties shall become effective from 
the date of exchange or deposit of ratification, unless some 
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other date has been agreed upon through an express pro-
vision". The following authors accept this doctrine: 
O P P E N H E I M , BRIERLY, M C N A I R , BASDEVANT, DÜPUIS, ANZILOTTI, 
CAVAGLIERI, FIORE and G E M M A . 
The Jurisprudence of the United States was contradicted 
by other countries. 
The English High Court of Justice rejected the argu-
ment that the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles — Ja-
nuary lOth, 1920 — operated retroactively back to the date 
of signature — June 28th, 1919. 
In the case of Cominelli v. CAPELLI, the Italian Court 
of Cassation decided that the full international effects of 
the Treaty of St. Germain had begun on the date of the 
exchange of ratifications and not from the date of signa-
ture. 
The *Supreme Court of Poland in Schrager v. Work-
men's Accident Insurance Institute for Moravia Silesia 
and in Gospodarstwa Krajowega v. Czyzewics, alleging 
considerations of equity or good faith adopted the rule of 
retroactivity. But these decisions do not seem to approve 
retroactivity as a general principie. 
Normally the decision on international arbitration 
courts have not accepted the rule of retroactivity. Never-
theless in the Chilean-Peruvian Accounts — 1875 —, the 
arbiter declared the treaty operative from the signature, 
but he did not make any reference to an international prac-
tice in this sense. 
The umpire in the Sambiaggio Case (1902) considered 
that treaties should not be interpreted to operate retro-
actively unless the same treaty so provided. 
Considerable discussion about the principie of retroac-
tivity was made in the Iloilo Claims, before the British-
-American Claims Tribunal. Great Britain made claims 
against the United States concerning a property destroyed 
at Iloio, by the Filipinos in February, 1899. Britain accused 
the United States of being responsible for the maintenance 
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of order in Iloilo as from the date of signature of the treaty 
of Paris (December lOth, 1898), in which Spain surrended 
the Philippine Islands to the United States. The ratifica-
tions of this treaty were exchangedon April llth, 1899, after 
the disturbances contemplated by the claims. 
The United States answered that the destruction of pro-
perty had happened at a time when Iloilo was still Spanish 
territory, because the sovereignty over the archipelago 
passed to the United States on April llth, 1899, date of 
the exchange of ratifications. 
The tribunal laid that "de jure" there was no sovereignty 
over the island until the treaty was ratified, thus accepting 
that the treaty was effective on the date of the exchange of 
ratifications and not on the date of signature. 
The PCIJ did not make direct pronouncements on the 
question of retroactivity of treaties. 
The Harvard Convention which aimed at "setting forth 
what is deemed to be the existing law of the treaties" in its 
article 11, codified the winning doctrine: 
"Unless otherwisse provided in the treaty itself, a 
treaty which comes into force subsequently to the time of 
signature shall not be deemed to have effect as from the 
time of signature". 
This article is a total rejection of the rule of retroacti-
vity. The treaties, however, m a y operate retroactively if 
they so expressly provide. 
M c N A I R stated that "the rule of retroactivity can no 
longer be accepted". 
The Vienna Convention seems to consider only the non-
-retroactivity of provisions of the treaty back even to a time 
antedating the conclusion of the treaty. Combining never-
theless, syllogistically some articles of the Convention, w e 
will see that it implicitly consigned also the non-retroacti-
vity of ratification to the date of signature. 
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Acoording to article 28, the provisions of the treaty be-
come binding at the date of its coming into force. Number 
2 of article 24 declares that the treaty comes into force 
when there is consent of the States that have participated 
in the negotiations. The consent is expressed by the ratifi-
cation, when it is foreseen in the treaty, in the negotiations 
or in the full power (article 14) or by signature only if it 
is so provided by the negotiations or by the full powers (ar-
ticle 12). Hence the dispositions of treaty become binding 
by the ratification or by signature (when the ratification is 
not required). 
W e m a y n o w replace the final part of art. 28 "the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that 
party" by "the date of ratification or signature (when the 
ratification is not required)" and w e will note clearly the 
prohibition of the retroactivity of ratification to the date 
of signature. 
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